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This study is the first to estimate mothers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for job 
amenities directly. Its identification strategy relies on German maternity leave length. The key 
aspect of the maternal leave framework is that mothers can decide whether and when to return 
to their guaranteed job. Thus, in contrast to previous studies that analyze the job search of 
employed workers, this framework allows us to overcome the limitation of not observing the 
wage/amenity offer process. A theoretical model of the leave length decision is derived from a 
random utility approach. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the 
Qualification and Career Survey, this model is estimated by a discrete duration method. The 
MWP for amenities can be inferred through the estimated elasticities of the leave length with 
respect to the amenities and the wage. The results provide evidence that mothers are willing to 
sacrifice a significant fraction of their wage to reduce hazards (22%) and to enjoy a flexible 
working schedule (36-56%). 
JEL Code: J31, J33, J22. 
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1. Introduction 
Almost  40%  of  mothers  in  the  OECD  are  currently  not  participating  in  the  labor 
force.
1 Among women with small children (younger than 3 years old) this percentage is even 
higher; at this time, 47% of them are inactive. Conversely, labor force participation among 
childless women is similar to that of men (73% versus 75%, respectively). Given that career 
interruptions lead to human capital depreciation and hence, to a loss in long term income and 
career opportunities, it is crucial to understand the incentives that mothers face when deciding 
whether and when to return to work after childbirth. So far, however, we lack any direct 
measure of the extent to which mothers' work decision is triggered by certain job features.
2 
Therefore, this study provides a first estimate for mothers' marginal willingness to pay (MWP 
hereafter) for certain job related amenities.  
Estimating the MWP for amenities is a complex endeavor and earlier research has failed 
to provide conclusive evidence.
3 Gronberg and Reed (1994), for instance, focus on the job 
search of employed male workers. However, because of the unobservability of potential job 
offers, the authors are limited to estimating the impact of current job features on job tenure 
and fall short of separating these effects from those of the wage and amenities of latent job 
offers. Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) address this limitation by explicitly modeling 
the  wage/amenity  offer  process.  They  show  that  despite  weak  compensating  wage 
differentials, there is a systematic and significant MWP for job related amenities, in particular 
for job security. 
                                                           
1 All numbers on mothers’ labor force participation are taken from www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database. 
2 There is some evidence that unfavorable working conditions (such as hazards, inflexible schedules, etc.) might 
be important deterrents to returning to work (Bratti et al., 2004; De Leire and Levy, 2004; Felfe, 2008).  
3 Note, there is a long literature on compensating wage differentials dating back to Rosen (1976). Since then 
empirical research has tried to estimate the compensation paid for disamenities using so called hedonic wage 
regressions (among others Lucas, 1977; Brown, 1981; Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). Nevertheless, Hwang et al. 
(1998), prove theoretically that estimates from hedonic wage regressions are biased as they fail to consider the 
dynamic nature of the labor market. Gronberg and Reed (1994) are the first to address this issue. Notice, they 
estimate  the  price  that  workers'  are  willing  to  pay  for  amenities  and  not  the  compensating  differentials 
determined by the market. The present study draws heavily upon their suggested strategy. 3 
 
The present study suggests an alternative framework for the estimation of the MWP for 
amenities. Its identification strategy relies on German statutory maternity leave and thus on 
the time mothers decide to spend out of the labor force. The key proposition is that maternity 
leave will be shorter if a mother’s job, which is guaranteed while being on leave, offers more 
attractive characteristics such as higher wages and more amenities. Given this proposition, the 
MWP can be derived by dividing the elasticity of maternity leave length with respect to a 
certain amenity by the elasticity with respect to the wage. 
For  the  purpose  of  identification,  the  advantage  of  using  Germany  is  its  generous 
parental leave system; since 1992, German working mothers are entitled to a leave of 36 
months.
4
 During this period, mothers enjoy a job guarantee and, hence, are free to decide 
whether and when to return to their jobs. The remarkable length of this period allows for 
sufficient variation in the chosen duration of maternal leave. More importantly, the fact that 
jobs are guaranteed for the whole period enables observation of all the relevant features of the 
options mothers face while on leave: staying at home or returning to their guaranteed job 
during their legally granted leave period of 36 months. One may argue that since mothers may 
search for a new job while being on leave, I may likewise fail to observe possible external job 
offers. The data shows, however, that mothers rarely change jobs during maternal leave (only 
2%).  The  job  guarantee  during  the  maternal  leave  period  is  thus  the  key  element  in  this 
strategy to estimate the MWP. 
My results, obtained from a discrete duration model using data from the German Socio 
Economic Panel and the Qualification and Career Survey, reveal that mothers are willing to 
sacrifice a significant fraction of their wage to reduce hazardous working conditions (more 
than  22%  for  a  reduction  of  one  standard  deviation)  and  to  enjoy  a  working  schedule 
compatible  with  available  daycare  (36 56%).  Stratification  according  to  education,  total 
                                                           
4 Germany, Austria, Finland and France provide the most generous parental leave systems in the OECD. The US, 
in contrast, entitles recent mothers only to a leave of 12 weeks. For a comparison see: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm 4 
 
household income and geographical location reveal the following pattern: high educated and 
high income mothers show a higher disposition to trade wages for better working conditions; 
mothers in West Germany, where public childcare is particularly rare, are willing to accept 
higher trade offs between wages and flexible working schedules.
5 
This  study  contributes  to  the  literature  in  two  different  ways:  first,  its  unique 
identification  strategy  allows  for  an  improvement  of  the  MWP  measurement;  second,  it 
provides unprecedented insight into the price mothers are willing to pay to enjoy certain 
amenities.  Given  one  major  challenge  many  industrialized  countries  are  currently  facing, 
namely the decline of the workforce relative to the total population, understanding mothers' 
preferences with respect to certain job characteristics is crucial as it may allow us to activate 
some unused work potential.  
  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  brief 
introduction to German leave legislation. The theoretical and empirical model is developed in 
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 reports the estimation results and Section 6 
concludes  with  suggestions  for  an  efficient  policy  design  aimed  at  improving  mothers' 
situation in the labor market. 
 
2. Parental Leave Legislation 
  Germany is one of the OECD countries with the most generous parental leave system. 
It consists of three parts: maternity protection, protected parental leave and parental benefits. 
   The first, maternity protection, regulated by the maternity protection law (1979), refers 
to a period of six weeks before and eight weeks after birth during which mothers must not 
work.
6 The second, protected parental leave, allows the mother to choose between staying on 
                                                           
5 Notice, private childcare facilities are not common in Germany. Due to high regulation and a lack of public 
subsidies, it is not profitable to run a private childcare institution. 
6 During this period, the mother receives her net wage rate. The social security pays 13€ per day, while the 
employer has to cover the remaining amount.  5 
 
leave and returning to work during a certain period after giving birth.
7 Since the parental leave 
is the true period during which a mother is free to decide about her participation in the labor 
market, the present study focuses on this period. 
  The Federal Law of Parental Leave and Parental Benefit was introduced in 1986. It 
allows a woman to take some extra months off beyond the maternity protection period, while 
keeping  the  option  to  return  to  her  former  job;  i.e.  the  employer  has  to  guarantee  her  a 
position comparable to her former one. The parental leave has been subsequently extended 
from a length of 10 months at the time of its introduction in 1986 to a length of 36 months 
since 1992. A mother is eligible for parental leave if she has worked at least six months in the 
same job before childbirth and if she informs her employer in advance about her leave plans.
8 
This law also regulates the maternity benefits, the third pillar of the maternity leave 
legislation. The government pays the benefit conditional on the mother taking care of her 
child; in other words, it is paid as long as the mother remains on leave.
9 Until 1992 this 
benefit was provided for the whole leave period, but since 1992 for at most 24 months of the 
total parental leave period. While before 1994 the parental benefit was independent from 
household  income,  afterwards  it  became  income  dependent.
10  There  are  two  income 
thresholds, one affects the payment of the benefit in months 1 6 and the other applies to 
months 7 24.
11 An income higher than the respective threshold incurs a complete loss of the 
benefit during the first six months, but only a gradual reduction of the benefit after month six. 
Since 2001 a mother has the choice between two different benefit versions; either, as before, 
she receives a benefit of up to 300€ for 24 months or a higher benefit of up to 450€ for only 
12 months.   
                                                           
7 Even if both parents are eligible for parental leave, in practice less than 5% of the fathers are taking leave. 
8 A woman has to inform her employer six weeks in advance of when she wants to take maternal leave and how 
long she wants to go on leave (she has to declare her leave intention for the first 24 months at least). 
9 A mother is allowed to work at most 19h/week (from 2001 on: 30h/week) to receive the benefit. 
10 Note, the amount of the benefits is not linked to previous maternal wages, but only depends on the remaining 
household income, such as husband's labor earnings, income from capital assets, etc.. 
11 The total income during the first six months (months 7 24) after birth cannot exceed 51000€ (20500€) for a 
two parent household and 38000€ (16500€) for a single parent household. 6 
 
Previous studies have shown that the leave legislation, especially the total leave length, affects 
mothers’ work decisions.
12 Therefore, in the following analysis I consider only the years from 
1992 until 2006, during which the parental leave has gone unchanged.  
The  subsequent  section  introduces  the  random  utility  model  which  underlies  the 
estimation of mothers' leave length decision. 
  
3. A Model of Parental Leave Length 
3.1. The Basic Model 
  The following model captures the relevant considerations of a mother when deciding 
about the length of parental leave. The decision about the length is implicitly assumed to be 
the result of rational decision making, in the sense that choice is influenced by the expected 
costs and benefits of the available alternatives. The objective is to reveal the impact of the 
wage and amenities of the guaranteed job on the chosen leave duration. 
I assume that a woman derives utility from her own consumption, leisure time and the 
amenities implied by her job. The utility function of a mother i for every single month t of the 
leave period, before making any assumptions about functional forms, is as follows:                  
 
Uit = U (Cit; tLit; Aio(1  Lit); Xi; αi; εLit,it)            (1) 
 
  Cit represents the level of consumption of woman i in month t. Lit stands for leisure,  
which is assumed to be binary; i.e., the woman can only derive utility from leisure when being 
on leave. The interaction between leisure and the months the mother has been already on 
leave, indicated by the variable t, allows the utility of being on leave to change over time.
13 
This accounts for the possibility that a mother’s time spent at home might be worth less over 
time, e.g. due to home productivity decreasing with the age of the child. Ai0 are the amenities 
                                                           
12 see Ondrich, Spiess, Yang and Wagner (2003); Schönberg and Ludsteck (2006). 
13 Due to the binary definition of leisure, this boils down to parallel shifts of the marginal utility over time. 7 
 
implied by the guaranteed job. The index 0 of the amenities refers to the period previous to 
birth and indicates that due to the job guarantee a mother faces after maternity leave the same 
amenities as before. The interaction of the amenities with the leave variable indicates that a 
mother can only experience utility from amenities while working. Xi contains both relevant 
personal  and  professional  characteristics.  Finally,  αLi  and  εLit,it  incorporate  individual 
heterogeneity with respect to the utility women derive from having a baby overall and in the 
different months after giving birth, which are assumed to vary with the working status.  
  A mother faces a budget constraint that, in addition to other sources of income such as 
her husband’s income, capital income and so forth, is determined by her own wage and by the 
maternity benefit. Her budget constraint can be expressed as follows:
14 
 
Cit = Ii0 + Wi0(1   Lit) + B(Iio; yr; t) Lit            (2) 
   
where Ii0 stands for other sources of income such as the husband’s earnings, capital 
income  etc.
15  Wi0  is  the  wage  she  receives  when  going  back  to  her  guaranteed  job  and 
B(Ii0;yr;t) represents the maternal benefit while being on leave. The benefit, as explained in 
Section 2, is a function of other sources of income (Ii0), the year in which the baby is born 
(yr), and the number of months woman i has already been on leave (t).   
The above stated problem describes a utility maximization problem: conditional on 
being eligible for maternity leave and given her budget constraint, a mother decides on the 
duration of her leave in order to maximize her utility over the 36 month period.
16 Due to the 
job guarantee, the utility from returning to work is constant over the total leave period; i.e. 
since a mother has the right to return to her former job with the same wage and the same 
                                                           
14 Note that I assume no savings. Furthermore, I abstain from costs of a daycare place, as there is almost no 
daycare (for children under the age of 3) available in Germany. 
15 The subindex 0 is based on the fact that other sources of income are assumed to be constant: a mother has to 
decide about the leave before taking it and the benefit is calculated according to the income previous to birth.  
16 After the 36
th month, the job guarantee no longer exists, so she would have to start searching for a new job if 
she would like to participate in the labor market again. Therefore, the model considers only the 36 months of the 
total leave period during which a mother enjoys a job guarantee. 8 
 
amenities during 36 months, she will face the same utility irrespective of the timing of her 
return.
17 The utility gained from remaining on leave, on the contrary, is dependent on time. 
This is due to the declining benefit payment and the decreasing utility of staying at home over 
time. Thus, once the utility of being on leave is lower than that of working in a given month t, 
it remains lower for the rest of the leave period. The decision to return to work is thus a once 
and for all decision; i.e., as soon as the utility of working is greater than or equal to the utility 
of being on leave, a mother returns to work and stays until the end of the total leave period. 
The hazard rate, which is the probability that a mother i starts working in month t conditional 
on having been on leave until month t 1, is thus as follows:  
 
λ (workit) = λ (Uworkit >Uleaveit) 
  = λ (U(Ii0 +Wi0; 0; Ai0; Xi; α0; ε0it)>U(Ii0 + B(Ii0; yr; t); t; 0; Xi; α1; ε1it)   (3) 
 
This expression allows for predictions regarding the effect of the variables of interest: 
the higher the wage a mother is sacrificing while not working, the higher the opportunity costs 
of being on leave and thus the shorter the leave. Assuming that amenities enter positively into 
the utility function, a mother rather returns to work early when she is exposed to amenities.  
  Our final objective is to estimate mothers’ MWP for certain amenities. Following the 
approach by Gronberg and Reed (1994), we can use the elasticities of the hazard rate with 
respect to wage and to a certain amenity to derive the MWP: 
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  From here it is straightforward, using the derivatives of the hazard rate with respect to 
wage and amenities, to calculate the MWP for a certain amenity:              
                                                           
17 Employers have to guarantee the mother a comparable job. There is no wage guarantee. Note, however, that 
the majority of workers in Germany are covered by collective bargaining agreements. In Section 5.2, I discuss 
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  We can see that the MWP is determined by the marginal utility of consumption UC 
and the marginal utility of the amenity UA. The MWP is inversely related to the marginal 
utility  of  consumption;  i.e.,  the  higher  the  marginal  increase  in  utility  due  to  more 
consumption, the less wage a mother is willing to sacrifice for an amenity. The opposite is 
true for amenities; i.e., the higher the marginal utility of an amenity, the more wage a mother 
would give up in order to enjoy this amenity.  
  This  model  is  of  course  simplistic  and  ignores  the  possibility  that  mothers  might 
search for a new job while being on leave. However, as the data demonstrate, this assumption 
is far from being unrealistic; mothers see their job guarantee as a kind of insurance and thus 
rarely  change  jobs  during  their  maternity  leave  (only  2%).  This  assumption  of  no  job 
searching is the key stone of the model; in contrast to the approach by Gronberg and Reed, the 
setting of maternity leave allows me to observe all relevant alternatives mothers face while on 
leave. The model thus offers a framework that allows for an economic interpretation of the 
parameters and for an accurate derivation of mothers’ MWP for amenities. 
3.2. Implementation 
  In  order  to  estimate  the  model,  we  need  to  make  some  assumptions  about  the 
functional form of the utility and the distribution of the residuals. For simplicity, I assume a 
linear individual utility function, so that equation (1) becomes:                                                                      
 
  Uit = βCit + γ0(1   γ1t)Lit + δA i0(1   Lit) + ηLitXi + αLi + εLit;it      (6) 
 
where again Cit stands for consumption, Lit for the binary variable leave, Ai0 for the 
amenities of the guaranteed job, and Xi for both personal and professional characteristics.
  Consumption,  as  given  by  equation  (2),  is  determined  by  the  total  income  of  a 
household which consists of the mother’s wage Wi0, in case she is back to work, the maternal 10 
 
benefit,  in  case she  is  on  leave, and  other  sources  of  income  Ii0. In  order  to  capture  the 
determinants of the maternal benefit, I include additionally a set of year and month dummies. 
The consumption coefficient β is expected to be positive since a higher disposable income is 
assumed to increase utility. The effect of being on leave on utility is assumed to be not only 
direct  but  also  to  change  over  time,  which  is  captured  by  a  decomposition  of  the  leave 
coefficient: one general coefficient, γ0, and another one, γ1, which interacts with the leave 
length t. In this way, I allow the utility of being on leave to decrease over time. This effect is 
controlled for by a set of month dummies. The main interest lies in the impact of amenities on 
utility. Thus, a great variety of amenities Ai0 is included in the regression (see Section 4.2 for 
details). The coefficient δ is expected to be positive, indicating an increasing effect of an 
amenity on utility. Last, utility is assumed to vary with both personal characteristics, such as 
age, partnership, education, region and the number of children, and with properties of the 
profession, such as the sector in which the woman works, all captured by Xi.
18 Allowing the 
coefficient  η  to  depend  on  the  working  status  of  the  mother  reflects  the  possibility  that 
professional and personal features might influence the utility differently, depending on if a 
mother is on leave or back to work.  
Under  the  additional  assumption  that  (ε0it ε1it)  follows  a  logistic  distribution,  the 
probability of working in month t conditional on having been on leave in month t 1, equals:
 19  
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  where ψt represents personal variables, sector and year dummies. The estimation of the 
coefficients is, however, complicated by the fact that mothers might differ systematically in 
their  behavior  and  ability,  even  though  they  are  observationally  identically.  Since  the  
                                                           
18 Including the sector shall account for sectoral differences, especially differences in the rate of human capital 
depreciation. 
19 The results are robust to different assumptions about the error distributions and available upon request. 11 
 
composition  of  the  sample  of  survivors  changes  as  time  proceeds,  with  respect  to  both, 
observed and unobserved characteristics, ignoring this unobserved heterogeneity can lead to 
inconsistent estimators. Hence, I estimate the leave decision using a discrete logistic duration 
model and allow for unobserved heterogeneity introducing a log normally distributed time 
invariant individual component (α0i  α1i).
20,21  





















              (8) 
  Given the positive coefficient of  the wage and of the amenities, the MWP for an 
amenity should be positive. Thus, the model predicts that a mother is willing to sacrifice part 
of her wage to enjoy certain amenities.  
The next section describes the datasets used and the construction of the amenities. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. The German Socio-Economic Panel and the Qualification and Career Survey 
  For the analysis of mothers’ MWP for job related amenities, two datasets are used: the 
German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Qualification and Career Survey (QCS). 
The GSOEP is an annually repeated survey of Germans and foreigners in East and West 
Germany, which has followed its members continuously since 1984. This study uses waves 
1992 2006  which  correspond  to  the  period  during  which  the  maternity  leave  period  has 
                                                           
20  I  estimate  the  model  assuming  different  functional  forms  for  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  (e.g.  gamma 
distribution, discrete mass points). The results however do not alter significantly. This lies in line with the 
findings of Han and Hausman (1990) and Meyer (1990) that in case of a non parametric baseline hazard the 
estimates show little sensitivity to alternative functional forms for the individual time invariant error term. 
21 Notice, this type of correction only allows for correction of individual time invariant heterogeneity which is 
independent  of  the  observable  individual  characteristics.  One  further  issue,  namely  the  potential  sorting  of 
mothers  into  occupations  which  offer  the  characteristics  that  correspond  to  their  preferences  for  work  and 
parenting, might not be tackled with this random effect type model. This issue of occupational sorting will be 
discussed more in Section 5.3. So far, please bear in mind, that the coefficients have to be interpreted as the 
causal effect of the characteristics of the guaranteed job plus the preference of a mother for a certain type of job. 12 
 
remained unchanged. The QCS is a survey of employees carried out by the German Federal 
Institute  for  Vocational  Training  (Bundesinstitut  für  Berufsbildung)  and  the  Institute  for 
Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt  und Berufsforschung). There are four cross 
sections  launched  in  1979,  1985/86,  1991/92,  and  1998/99,  each  covering  about  30,000 
individuals. For this study, the latest cross section is used since it lies within the time at which 
the sample of mothers takes parental leave and is the only cross section that includes a 4 digit 
occupational code that allows a merging of the two datasets.
22 
  The GSOEP and the QCS have several features that make them especially suitable for 
the proposed methodology to estimate mothers’ MWP for amenities. The GSOEP has detailed 
annual information on personal as well as on some professional characteristics such as the 
individual’s  occupation,  the  wage  and  the  working  schedule.  Furthermore,  it  provides 
monthly information on fertility as well as professional activities, such as working and being 
on maternity leave. This information allows me to construct maternity leave spells for each 
woman and to determine her occupation prior to childbirth. The QCS contains a great variety 
of occupational amenities, which complements the occupational information provided by the 
GSOEP. Details about the amenities contained in the QCS are given below. 
  The sample of interest includes all women who gave birth during 1992 2005 and were 
eligible for maternity leave.
23 As described in Section 2, eligibility for maternity leave is 
conditional on having worked for at least six months on the same job. According to the 
Federal  Statistical  Office,  in  2003,  90%  of  West  German  women  qualified  for  maternity 
leave, while not even 65% of East German mothers did so. In spite of being less eligible for 
maternity leave, East German women more often exercise their right to maternity leave: 95% 
of eligible women in East Germany take some leave, while in West Germany only 80% do so.  
                                                           
22 Alternatively I use the 3 digit occupational code, which is available for waves 1991/92 and 1998/99. The 
results using this alternative code barely differ and are available upon request. 
23 An important part of the information is reported retrospectively; thus, not all necessary information can be 
recovered for the last available wave 2006. 13 
 
  The data provided by the GSOEP suffer from two shortcomings: first, the monthly 
activity history is partly left censored, which complicates the derivation of mothers’ eligibility 
for maternity leave. Relaxing the eligibility condition and treating every woman as eligible 
who is observed in an employment contract for at least one month before giving birth, 85% of 
West and 65% of East German women in the sample qualified for maternity leave in 2003.  
  The  second  problem  in  the  data  is  that  activities  are  often  simultaneously  and 
sometimes incorrectly reported. If declaring several parallel activities I give preference to 
being on leave. According to the maternity protection law, women are not allowed to work in 
the  first  eight  weeks  after  giving  birth.  However,  more  than  5%  of  the  women  reported 
working during the maternity protection period. Since these spells are certainly mis reported, 
I exclude all leave spells that are shorter than two months.  
  The final sample includes 1404 leave spells (28,587 individual month observations).
 24 
607 women returned to their job, out of which 31 continued working immediately after the 
protection period. 208 women were on leave for the whole parental leave period and did not 
exercise their right to return to work during the first three years after birth. The remaining 589 
spells are right censored, thus we do not know whether and when they returned to work. That 
said, we observe high panel attrition, an issue which is further discussed in Section 5.3.  
4.2. Amenities 
  As  mentioned  above,  the  GSOEP  contains  information  on  individual  wages  and 
personal working schedules, in particular working hours (including overtime), frequency of 
working in the evening (6 9pm), during the night (9pm 6am) and in rotating shifts. The QCS 
provides information on additional, more specific job features that are not provided by the 
                                                           
24 These spells include leave spells following the first until the fifth birth. In case a woman reported being on 
leave several times, I treat this as a separate spell, while controlling for the order of birth. In Section 5.3., I 
estimate a competing risk model of only first birth spells. 14 
 
GSOEP:
25  physical  demand  of  the  job,  lifting  heavy  weights  (>20  kg),  lying  down  or 
kneeling, standing during most of the shift, if the job is tiring for the eyes, if the job exposes 
the worker to dust or smoke, to a dirty working environment, to extreme climate conditions, 
to noise and to risks of injury. These amenities, actually in this case rather disamenities, can 
be matched with the sample of women on maternity leave via the 4 digit occupational code of 
the Federal Statistical Institute, which is contained in both datasets. Thus, the final sample 
contains information about the occupation in which a woman worked prior to giving birth, the 
individual  wage,  the  personal  working  schedule,  and  the  average  occupational  aspects  of 
workload and hazards.  
  In  order  to  create  representative  average  occupational  characteristics,  I  restrict  the 
1998/99 wave of the QCS to women in their child bearing ages (16 46 years), like the ones in 
the  sample  of  interest.  These  women  are  engaged  in 772  different  occupations.  For  each 
occupation I calculate the mean of every amenity. In the original QCS questionnaire, the 
women  are  asked  if  they  are  never,  rarely,  sometimes,  often  or  always  exposed  to  the 
respective condition, which is coded into discrete values of 0 to 4. However, averaging these 
discrete values for different occupations produces values that are close to being continuous on 
a  scale  from  0  to  4.  For  interpretational  convenience,  I  rescale  the  average  occupational 
characteristics from 0 to 100: the occupation with the highest level of a certain condition takes 
the value 100 and the lowest level takes 0.
26  
   The above described occupational characteristics are very detailed and specific. For 
the  purpose  of  significance  and  plausible  interpretation,  I  create  two  indices  (unweighted 
averages), summarized as “workload” and “hazards”, according to the distinction made in the 
                                                           
25 The GSOEP contains some information about broadly defined amenity categories. For my objective, however, 
these categories are to general and furthermore subjective. Estimation results using these variables display only 
low significance levels.  
26 For every amenity we observe both the highest (100) and the lowest (0). An example might illustrate this 
ranking: workers in the plastic industry are the ones most exposed to risks of injury and death (they all report the 
value 4); while secretaries are least threatened by these dangers (they all report the value 0). Thus, the plastic 
industry gets the average value of 100 for risks of injury, while secretaries get 0. All other occupations are 
ranked in between.   15 
 
literature on compensating wage differentials.
27 The following characteristics are included in 
each  of  the  two  indices:  “workload”  contains  having  a  physically  demanding  job,  lifting 
heavy weights (>20 kg), lying down or kneeling, standing all the time and having a job that is 
tiring for the eyes; while “hazards” incorporate being exposed to dust or smoke, dirt or oil, 
extreme climate conditions, noise and risks of injury. The respective amenities within the two 
groups are sufficiently correlated among each other and hence represent reliable measures for 
the aspects of workload and hazards.
28 
  To  summarize,  the  sample  contains  women  eligible  for  maternity  leave,  their 
individual wages, their personal working schedule (both taken from the GSOEP) and indices 
for  average  occupational  workload  and  hazards  (both  constructed  using  the  QCS).  In  the 
subsequent section, I present some descriptive statistics of the sample, the estimation results 
and several robustness checks. 
 
5. Estimation Results  
5.1. Variables and Summary Statistics 
  The first step of the analysis of mothers' MWP for amenities is to estimate the model 
of mothers’ decision about maternity leave length. The determinants of interest are wages Wi0 
and amenities Ai0. These characteristics belong to the job a mother holds before going on 
maternity leave and to which she can return given the job guarantee during the whole leave 
period. An overview can be found in Table 1. For illustrative purposes, Table 2a provides a 
list of the top ten jobs, ranked in a descending order according to their level of hazards and 
workload. Additionally, Table 2b introduces the most common occupations among recent 
mothers and displays the respective mean of the different job characteristics.  
                                                           
27For the construction of the unweighted averages I follow Rosen (1986) or Villanueva (2007). Alternatively, I 
employ  factor  analysis.  Estimation  results  using the  resulting factors  barely  differ  from our  results and  are 
available upon  request. 
28 The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73 for workload and 0.81 for hazards.  16 
 
  The pecuniary aspect of the job is included in the estimation as the natural logarithm 
of the real gross wage rate. The average monthly gross income is 1600€ (the natural logarithm 
of  the  real  gross  wage  is  2.3).  The  non pecuniary  characteristics  are  grouped  into  the 
following three aspects: the working schedule, workload and hazards. With respect to the 
working  schedule  we  observe  the  following:  Women  work  on  average  35  hours,  which 
includes on average 2 hours overtime. Quite a few mothers work in the evening (20%), at 
night (almost 9%) and in rotating shifts (almost 14%). With respect to average occupational 
workload and hazards the ranking shown in Table 2a tells us the following: The industry that 
demands  the  highest  workload  and  the  highest  level  of  hazards  is  the  plastic  industry. 
Mothers, however, work mostly in occupations that expose them to slightly better conditions 
(see Table 2b). The most common occupation among mothers, nursing, exposes their workers 
to only 10.61% of the hazards and 64.04% of the workload involved in the plastic industry. 
Notice, while the level of hazards nurses are exposed to, corresponds to the average level of 
hazards (10.56) involved in mothers' occupations, the physical effort nurses have to exert lies 
above the average level (39.90). Further popular jobs among young mothers, such as banking 
and retail, offer even better conditions: the level of workload is 29.11 and 48.94, and of 
hazards 2.69 and 6.97, respectively. 
  The maternity leave decision is also influenced by institutions, such as the maternal 
benefit or the child care facilities. The benefit is proxied by the total household income Ii0 and 
a set of year (1992 2005) and month dummies (36). The month dummies account furthermore 
for the fact that the utility of being on leave may decline with the age of the child. With the 
exception of East Germany, publicly available childcare for children under the age of 3 is 
very precarious in Germany; only 3% are actually covered by formal childcare. Hence, I 
control for this difference by including a dummy for East and West Germany. 
  As explained in Section 3, individual characteristics may play an important role for the 
leave decision. Table 3 gives an overview of the personal and household characteristics of the 17 
 
women  in  the  sample.  I  control  for  age,  partnership,  education,  income,  the  number  of 
previous children, and last the sector in which the woman has been working.  
  Before describing the regression results, notice the length of maternity leave and its 
relation with each job amenity. The Kaplan Meier Survival estimates display a smooth pattern 
of maternity leave lengths (see Table 4); mothers are observed to return to their guaranteed 
job  equally  at  any  months  of  the  maternity  leave  period.  A  first  look  at  the  relationship 
between leave length and wage, and leave length and amenities, without controlling for any 
other variables, already provides some useful insights (see Table 5). As expected, a higher 
wage is associated with a shorter maternity leave and worse hazards or workload with a 
longer leave. This is, however, only a first impression gained from the raw data. In the next 
section I present the results of the multivariate regression analysis which allow for more 
interpretation. 
5.2. Results 
As introduced in Section 3.2., I estimate the leave decision using a discrete duration 
model with a logistic hazard function and log normally distributed random effects. Table 6 
displays the resulting coefficients of the individual wage, the different aspects of the personal 
working schedule and the average occupational indices workload and hazards.  
  Models 1 to 3 compare the estimation results, controlling first for no other variables 
except mothers' job characteristics, then including additionally personal characteristics (age, 
education, partner, region, total household income and birth order), and last sector, month and 
year dummies. I also repeat the estimation under different assumptions for the functional form 
of  the  baseline  hazard:  including,  instead  of  month  dummies,  either  the  logarithm  or  a 
polynomial of the time being on leave (model 4 and 5 respectively). The results barely change 
with the different specifications. Thus, the following discussion of the results focuses on the 
specification assumed in model 3, including the full set of control variables and using a non 
parametric baseline hazard (month dummies). 18 
 
  The theory predicts that the higher the wage, and hence, the higher the opportunity 
costs  of  not  working,  the  more  likely  a  mother  is  to  return  to  her  job.  The  estimated 
coefficient of the ln of real gross wage confirms the prediction: women who have a job that 
pays 10% more wage per hour are 0.1% more likely to return to work in a given month (at the 
1% significance level). The model, as introduced in Section 3, suggests furthermore a positive 
effect of amenities on the decision to return to work. The estimated coefficient of the hazards 
is in line with this prediction: women who have been working under bad working conditions 
tend to stay significantly (at the 5% level) longer on maternity leave: one standard deviation 
more of hazards (which corresponds to 10 units of hazards and, for example, to the difference 
in hazards a secretary or a nurse are exposed to) reduces the likelihood to return to work by 
0.3%. Estimating the model using as controls each of the different aspects included in the 
index “hazards” separately shows that the deterring effect stems mainly from jobs exposing 
the women to dust, smoke and extreme climate conditions.
 The actual effect of workload is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, looking at the separate effects of the different aspects of workload 
reveals  that  working  in  an  uncomfortable  position  such  as  stooping,  kneeling,  etc.,  has a 
significantly  negative  effect  on  returning  to  work.
29  The  working  schedule  influences  the 
decision of leave length as follows: mothers in jobs entailing on average ten hours more per 
week, are 0.1% less likely to work in a given month. Jobs requiring night work are also less 
attractive to mothers after childbirth (by 0.3%). However, both effects are not significant. In 
addition, women who have jobs that involve working in the evening or in rotating shifts are 
significantly (at the 5% level) more likely to work in a given month (by 0.5% and 0.8% 
respectively).   
The effect of personal characteristics on the leave length decision are in line with the 
findings of previous studies; 30 women who are older and have a partner, several children and 
more financial resources are less likely to work soon after childbirth, while women who live 
                                                           
29 The estimation results including all job characteristics separately are available upon request. 
30 The full set of estimated coefficients is available upon request. 19 
 
in  East  Germany  and  are  highly  educated  tend  to  return  to  work  earlier.  Testing  for  the 
presence of individual time invariant heterogeneity, such as ability or preferences, reveals 
moreover a significant impact of these individual unobserved characteristics on the maternity 
leave length decision (the estimated coefficient of the random effect is significant at a 1%  
significance level). 
  Given the elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to wages and the selection of 
amenities, it is now straightforward to derive how much mothers are willing to pay for these 
amenities (see Table 7). In line with the estimated coefficients shown above, mothers are only 
willing to sacrifice a significant percentage of their wage for a decrease of hazards and to 
overcome a rigid working schedule. For a less hazardous work, mothers are willing to give up 
a significant (at the 5% level) amount: in order to suffer one standard deviation less dust, dirt, 
noise, extreme temperature or health risks, recent mothers are willing to sacrifice 22.2% of 
their wage. Furthermore, it may be more convenient for mothers to work in the evening or in 
rotating  shifts,  as  these  schedules  may  allow  for  an  informal  solution  of  childcare. 
Consequently, we can see that mothers are willing to sacrifice 35.6% of their wage to work in 
the evening and 55.1% for rotating shifts. 
The estimates for mothers' MWP are surprisingly high. Comparing my findings with 
the MWP for males found, for instance, by Gronberg and Reed (1994) and Bonhomme and 
Jolivet (forthcoming) and providing further outside evidence on the prevalence of certain job 
related  amenities  among  recent  mothers  might  give  some  support  to  my  estimates. 
Stratification according to individual or institutional characteristics might furthermore shed 
some  light  on  the  determinants  which  might  trigger  mothers'  MWP.  For  this  purpose,  I 
analyze  the  impact  of  wages  and  amenities  on  the  chosen  leave  duration,  distinguishing 
between mothers' regional, financial and educational background and last the chosen leave 
length.  20 
 
The basic regression results reveal that women after childbirth are disposed to pay 
significant amounts to avoid occupational hazards (22.2% for a reduction by one standard 
deviation). This estimate lies slightly above previous findings for the MWP of male workers. 
Gronberg  and  Reed  (1994),  for  instance,  find  a  MWP  of  13.4%  for  US  male  workers; 
Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) confirm this magnitude for Austrian, Danish and Dutch 
workers  (12.8 15.2%).
31  The  slightly  higher  MWP  for  good  working  conditions  among 
mothers is in line with findings of previous studies (DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Felfe, 2008) 
which attest a crowding of women, in particular of mothers, into safe jobs. Distinguishing 
between mothers with different financial and educational background, however, shows that 
not  all  women  are  willing  or  able  to  sacrifice  significant  parts  of  their  wage  to  reduce 
unpleasant or unhealthy conditions. Table 8a provides the MWP to avoid hazards for mothers 
of different income and education groups. A clear pattern arises: the more financial resources, 
the more wage a mother is willing to give up to diminish these hazards (18% 25% for a 
reduction by one standard deviation); likewise the more education a woman has, the bigger 
the accepted trade off between wage and hazardous conditions (0% 77%).  
  The  MWP  for  a  non standard  working  schedule  among  recent  mothers  might  be 
unexpectedly high at first sight. Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming), for instance, find a 
much  lower  MWP  for  a  convenient  working  schedule  among  Dutch  and  Danish  workers 
(15.2% and 22.0%, respectively). Notice, however, French workers are willing to sacrifice 
43.4% of their wage in order to work according to  suitable working times. Moreover, non 
standard  working  schedules  seem  to  be  more  widespread  among  parents.  Besides  putting 
forward the persistently higher prevalence of non standard working schedules among workers 
with children, Presser (2005) also elicits family reasons as the main predictor for non standard 
working hours. In other words, family obligations might be the driving force behind the high 
                                                           
31 Notice, Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) use a sample of 8 countries (Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal). For the purpose of comparison between their findings and my findings,  
it is reasonable to use only those countries which are similar to Germany in cultural aspects. 21 
 
MWP for work in the evening and in rotating shifts. Stratification of the estimation between 
East and West German women might help to investigate this hypothesis further. Remember, 
the coverage of childcare facilities for children under the age of three is very poor in West 
Germany,  as  only  3%  of  the  children  can  be  accommodated  in  formal  daycare.  In  East 
Germany, however, public childcare is available for every third child. Hence, regressions that 
control for interactions between the variety of job features and a dummy for East Germany 
could help to shed some light on the outlined hypothesis. As can clearly be seen in Table 8b, 
only  West  German  women  have  the  disposition  to  sacrifice  significant  (at  the  5%  level) 
amounts of their wage in order to adjust the working schedule to their family life; they are 
willing to accept a wage reduction of 1.3% to work one hour less, 53.7% to work in the 
evenings and 54.3% to enjoy rotating shifts. East German women, if anything, would have to 
receive a premium in order to work in the evenings (55.89% of their hourly wage, which 
however is not significant). These sharp differences between East and West Germany support 
the hypothesis that mothers' high MWP for non standard working schedules can be traced 
back to family obligations. Before turning to another issue, I want to provide some more 
evidence  which  could  give  support  to  this  interpretation.  In  case  a  non standard  working 
schedule  helps  parents  to  arrange  childcare  informally,  we  should  be  able  to  observe  an 
increase  in  the  compatibility  of  parents'  working  schedules  around  child  birth.  For  this 
purpose, I construct a measure indicating if the partners work according to complementary 
schedules and hence, if there is at least one person at home at any time of the day. Using a 
logit regression and controlling for demographic characteristics of the couple, such as age, 
education, region and having a child, shows that the presence of a child leads to increased 
complementarities of the working schedules, particularly in West Germany (15%).
32 Thus, 
these  results  support  once  more  the  hypothesis  that  mothers  appreciate  a  non standard 
working schedule as it allows them to coordinate the childcare informally with their partner.  
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The MWP for amenities might furthermore vary with the time mothers stay out of the 
labor  market.  This  variation  might  not  at  last  arise  due  to  the  fact  that,  despite  the  job 
guarantee,  conditions  at  the  workplace  might  change  over  time.  However,  comparing  the 
amenities before and after the maternity leave of the women who actually return to work (see 
Table 9a), we can observe major changes only in the wage and working hours.
33 First, the 
slight  decrease  in  wages  reflects  the  fact  that  the  job  guarantee  does  not  imply  a  wage 
guarantee. A mother might be aware of the possible wage depreciation and integrate the wage 
discount  into  her  decision  about  the  leave  length.  Thus,  the  impact  of  the  wage  on  the 
maternity leave decision might vary over time and is not, as previously assumed, stable over 
the whole leave period. Using the results from an estimation where additional interaction 
terms between the wage and dummies for all three years of the leave period are included 
reveals that the MWP to diminish hazards and to enjoy an unorthodox working schedule 
increases slightly, but not significantly over the years (see Table 9b). Second, the drop in 
working hours per week can be explained by the high fraction of mothers coming back only to 
a part time job. Since 2001, one has the right to reduce working hours as soon as the company 
has 15 employees or more. Including an interaction term between the reform and the size of 
the company as an additional control variable reveals that the right to work part time has a 
positive, but not significant impact on the leave length decision.  
5.3. Additional Specifications and Robustness Checks 
As already discussed in Section 3.2., modeling mothers' leave decision is complicated 
by the fact that mothers might differ systematically in their behavior, even though they are 
observationally identically. In the baseline estimation, presented in Section 5.2., I approached 
this problem by modeling the time invariant heterogeneity among mothers as a log normally 
distributed random effect. The key assumption of this correction method is no correlation 
between the unobserved characteristics and the control variables. Mothers, however, might 
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differ in their career aspirations and in their preferences for job conditions. These differences 
might cause mothers to sort into occupations which differ in the amount of amenities offered. 
In other words, job related amenities and mothers' unobserved characteristics might actually 
be correlated and thus, our estimated coefficients might be biased. Nevertheless, the direction 
of this bias is not obvious. One could argue that women who are career oriented return to 
work earlier, have a high preference for wage but not a strong preference for amenities. In this 
case, our estimated amenity coefficients would be biased towards zero, the estimated wage 
coefficient would be upward biased and the derived MWP for amenities would consequently 
provide a lower bound. However it may also hold true that women who try to combine career 
and family, i.e., want to have a child but also intend to work as soon as possible, sort into jobs 
that offer them a high level of amenities and thus allow for the compatibility of work and 
family. Should this actually be the case, the amenity coefficients and the above derived MWP 
would be overestimated. 
  One exercise to investigate if this presorting may bias the coefficients is to estimate 
the  model  using  a  subsample  of  women  who  cannot  choose  their  job  according  to  their 
personal preferences. In the former German Democratic Republic, people could not freely 
choose their job, but were assigned an occupation after finishing their education (in a so 
called “interview about the personal appropriateness”)
34. Consequently, East German women 
who had a baby shortly after the reunification had the same right to maternity leave as West 
German women, but did not have the opportunity to choose a job according to their family 
plans. Thus, restricting the sample to the first three years after reunification, 1992 94, and 
estimating the baseline model with additional interaction terms for the wage and amenities 
and a dummy for East German women should help us to investigate if presorting causes a 
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bias.
35 With respect to the MWP for better working conditions, no significant differences can 
be revealed for East German women soon after the German reunification. With respect to the 
working schedule, preferences of East German women right after the unification seem to 
resemble the preferences of all East German women. Hence, these results give rise to think 
that presorting into family friendly jobs might not affect mothers’ MWP. Due to the small 
sample size, however, we might not conclude statistically significant results. 
Besides differences in career aspirations, there might be diversity among women with 
respect to their family plans. First, the decision to become a mother might be triggered by the 
individual job situation. Due to an unsatisfying job situation women might, for instance, want 
to take a break from work and anticipate their family plans. In this case our sample would 
over represent women in worse job conditions who stay longer on leave. Consequently, the 
estimated  amenity  coefficients  would  be  upward  biased.  Previous  studies  (Lauer  and 
Mühlenweg, 2003; Bratti, et al. 2004), however, do not find any selection into motherhood 
due  to  job  features  when  estimating  the  decision  about  fertility  and  LFP  simultaneously. 
Second, so far we neglected a further option women have besides staying at home or returning 
to  work,  namely  getting  another  child.  Yet,  the  main  sample  includes  all  leave  spells, 
following first, second and further births. In case the birth of a further baby lies within the 
maternity  leave  period  following  the  birth  of  a  previous  baby,  this  spell  is  treated  as  a 
censored spell. In order to take into account the possibility of consecutive childbirths, I use a 
restricted sample including only spells after first childbirth and analyze mothers' decision 
between  staying  on  leave,  returning  to  work  or  having  another  baby.  For  this  purpose,  I 
estimate a competing risk model that represents the choice of mothers between these three 
alternatives during the 36 months after the first childbirth.
36 First time mothers demonstrate a 
similar willingness to accept significant wage cuts in order to reduce hazards (30% for a 
                                                           
35 A further reduction of the sample is not possible due to a small sample size. Due to high unemployment in 
East Germany, women, however, did not frequently change their job there in the years following reunification. 
The results of the estimation are available upon request. 
36 Estimation results of the competing risk model are available upon request. 25 
 
decrease of one standard deviation), and to be able to work during the evening (50%) or in 
rotating shifts (45%).  
  One last unobserved dimension, in which mothers might vary, is ability. First, one 
might think that employers are willing to offer more productive women both a higher wage 
and more amenities. Second, more capable women might also be more likely to return to work 
early. If ability is correlated with both better working conditions and a tendency to work, the 
coefficients estimated in the main specification may be overestimated. Considering, however, 
the nature of disamenities, such as dust, dirt, extreme temperatures, noise and certain health 
risks, it is difficult for an employer to treat more productive women differently with respect to 
the level of these disamenities. Moreover, the wage, measured on the individual level, should 
be  a  function  of  education,  experience,  ability,  and  so  forth,  and  thus  should  incorporate 
individual ability; i.e., the potential problem of endogeneity should be ruled out.
37 
  Before concluding, I want to address the above mentioned issue of attrition. So far I 
implicitly assume that “missing” women (3% per month on average) behave as the women 
continuously observed in the dataset. This is a strong assumption, since we cannot be sure that 
attrition is a random event. One way to check the robustness of the main specification is to 
estimate the model using samples extended under extreme assumptions: the “missing” women 
might start working as soon as they drop out of the sample, or they might never return to their 
job during the maternity leave period of 36 months. Under both extreme assumptions the 
results are robust.
38 
  To summarize, additional specifications confirm that the less hazardous the guaranteed 
job and the more flexible the working schedule, the shorter the maternity leave. The following 
                                                           
37 In the context of hedonic wage regressions, where the wage is the dependent variable, unobserved ability 
constitutes a more severe problem. As a further robustness check, I  use "permanent" wages (an average of the 
wage during all years previous to childbirth) instead of the individual wage prior to childbirth, as those  are less 
prone to measurement errors. Second, I use average occupational wages which are less likely to be correlated 
with ability. The results barely alter and are available upon request. 
38 Estimation results using the two, under extreme assumptions, extended samples are available upon request. 26 
 
section concludes and provides recommendations for a policy designed to allow mothers to 
better reconcile work and family. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  This study is, to my knowledge, the first to directly estimate mothers’ MWP for job 
related amenities. Its identification strategy relies on statutory maternity leave, exploiting the 
idea that maternity leave is expected to be shorter the higher the wage and the better the non 
wage aspects of the job a mother is guaranteed while being on leave. The focus of this study 
lies on Germany, where mothers are entitled with the most generous maternity leave (36 
months).  Using  data  from  the  German  Socio Economic  Panel  and  the  Qualification  and 
Career Survey, I first estimate the impact of wages and amenities on the choice of maternity 
leave  length  by  a  discrete  duration  method  that  assumes  a  logistic  hazard  function  and 
lognormal heterogeneity. I can then derive the MWP for amenities by taking the ratio of the 
elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to a specific amenity over the elasticity with respect 
to the wage. 
The suggested framework of this study contributes to the existing methodologies to 
measure the MWP. In contrast to previous studies (Gronberg and Reed, 1994 and Bonhomme 
and Jolivet, forthcoming), which look at job tenure of male workers and hence, fall short in 
observing all job offers made to the workers, the current approach allows me to overcome the 
limitations of modeling an explicit wage/disamenity offer process. In the case of maternity 
leave,  all  relevant  alternatives  available  to  mothers  while  being  on  leave  are  observable: 
staying at home or returning to the guaranteed job at some point during the 36 month period. 
The job guarantee, implied by the maternity leave, is thus the key component of my strategy 
to estimate mothers' MWP.  
This  study  provides  furthermore  knowledge  about  the  relevance  of  different  job 
aspects for mothers' labor force participation decision. Understanding mothers' preferences for 27 
 
certain job characteristics might show us how to pave the way back into the labor force for 
mothers. Given that mothers represent an enormous unused work potential (47% of young 
mothers  are  not working  in  the OECD),  an  efficient family  policy  design could  alleviate 
problems arising due to the ageing of society, which is a trend faced by many industrialized 
countries. 
The results of this study show that not only wages but also other non wage aspects are 
important  determinants  of  mothers  work  decision  and  reveal  the  following  concrete 
information  about  mothers’  preference  for  job related  amenities.  Hazards,  such  as  health 
risks, are highly avoided by mothers: they are willing to sacrifice 22.2% of their wage to 
improve their working conditions by one standard deviation. Distinguishing in the analysis 
between mothers' financial and educational background reveals that mainly high income and 
high educated women are willing to cut wages in favor of safer workplaces. In other words, 
only mothers who can either afford to choose their job according to personal preference or 
who are aware of potential consequences of menial jobs display a significant MWP to avoid  
job related hazards. The working schedule is pivotal for mothers when deciding how long to 
stay  at  home  after  childbirth.  A  non standard  schedule  seems  to  be  attractive  for  recent 
mothers; they are willing to accept severe wage cuts to be able to work during the evening 
(35.6%) or in rotating shifts (55.1%). Examining differences between East and West Germany 
demonstrates  that  only  West  German  mothers  exchange  wages  for  this  type  of  working 
schedule. This result suggests that the source of the high MWP for an unorthodox working 
schedule lies in institutional differences: the lack of child care facilities in West Germany 
might trigger a higher MWP to work according to this unusual schedule.  
  Last, the findings of this study allow me to attach a monetary value to every job 
characteristic and, hence, to establish a ranking of occupations according to the price mothers 
would be willing to pay to enjoy the involved amenities. In other words, this ranking provides 
us with some intuition about the most family friendly jobs. In terms of the flexible working 28 
 
schedule,  occupations  like  retail,  specialized  nursing  or  air  controlling,  offer  the  most 
adequate schedules for mothers. With respect to the working conditions, working in retail 
seems again to be the most adequate job for a young mother. Likewise, hotel clerks and 
laywers, for instance, enjoy a very pleasant working atmosphere. Taking the payment into 
consideration as well, occupations such as editors, gynecologists or high school teachers seem 
to be the professions that pay the most, in both monetary and non monetary terms. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Summary statistics of occupational characteristics 
VARIABLE  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Ln real gross wage  1404  2.3091  0.4922  0.0182  3.6162 
Hazards  1404  10.5600  11.1743  0  100 
Workload  1404  39.8958  14.2908  0  95 
Working hours  1404  35.1045  11.2334  0  70 
Work in the evening  1404  0.2058  0.4045  0  1 
Night work  1404  0.0897  0.2859  0  1 
Shift work  1404  0.1396  0.3467  0  1 








Table 2a: Occupations ranked in a descending order according to their level of disamenities 
Rank  Hazards  Workload 
1  plastic worker (100)  plastic worker (100) 
2  agronomist (65)  glass producer (80) 
3  chemistry lab worker(65)   agronomist (75) 
4  glass producer (60)  industrial engineer (70) 
5  industrial engineer (60)  animal breeder (68) 
6  chemistry worker (57)  nurse (operations) (68) 
7  ceramicist (55)  elderly care (67) 
8  motorcar engineer (53)  horse breeder (65) 
9  warehouse worker (52)  painter/lacquer (65) 
10  carpenter (51)  car lacquer (65) 
Note: I rank the occupation in which the women of the sample (women who are 
eligible for maternity leave) are working in, in a descending order according to 
their level of disamenities. The job on place 1, the plastic industry, exposes its 
workers to the highest amount of environmental hazards, while an agronomist is 
exposed to the second highest amount, etc. In total there are 100 ranks available. 






Table 2b: Level of hazards and workload involved in most common occupations of mothers 
 










Nurse  2.45  10.61  64.04  33.94  0.52  0.46  0.55 
Bank clerk  2.69  2.19  29.11  37.17  0.19  0.00  0.00 
Sales person  2.12  6.97  48.94  30.82  0.10  0.00  0.12 
Medical secretary  2.25  6.10  43.09  33.25  0.10  0.03  0.20 
Sectretary  2.41  2.17  23.42  36.46  0.12  0.03  0.06 
Educator  2.31  16.67  53.17  37.38  0.41  0.12  0.18 
Retail clerk  1.89  6.62  44.29  38.47  0.27  0.03  0.15 
Hairdresser  1.57  11.55  43.37  35.56  0.00  0.00  0.09 
Office clerk  2.03  2.15  23.14  37.02  0.03  0.00  0.03 








Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the personal and occupational characteristics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Age  1404  30.8697  4.5734  18  46 
Partner (in %)  1404  0.9330  0.2500  0  1 
Education (in years)  1404  12.0007  3.1835  1  18 
West (in %)  1404  0.8027  0.3981  0  1 
East (in %)  1404  0.1880  0.3909  0  1 
Other income sources  1404  32449  17413  0  219528 
Low income  1404  0.2457  0.4307  0  1 
Intermediate income   1404  0.3618  0.4807  0  1 
High income   1404  0.3832  0.4863  0  1 
Technology (in %)  1404  0.0548  0.2278  0  1 
Service (in %)  1404  0.6218  0.4851  0  1 
Manufacturing (in %)  1404  0.1510  0.3582  0  1 
Agriculture (in %)  1404  0.0071  0.0841  0  1 
Public admin. (in %)  1404  0.0776  0.2677  0  1 
Educational sector (%)  1404  0.0719  0.2585  0  1 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimate32 
 
Table 5: Binary relation between the disamenities and the total leave length 
Leave in months  <6  7-12  13-24  25-36 
Spells  197  245  450  512 
Frequency in %  0.14  0.17  0.32  0.36 
Ln real gross wage  2.3840  2.3789  2.3041  2.2513 
Hazards   9.3313  9.2750  11.1495  11.1295 
Workload  38.2271  39.6250  40.5249  40.1145 
Working hours(+overtime)  35.7086  34.4367  35.3400  34.9775 
Work in the evening  0.2234  0.2571  0.2467  0.1387 
Night work  0.1015  0.1102  0.1089  0.0586 
Shift work  0.0863  0.2122  0.1511  0.1152 
Note: The table above shows raw data: for four different leave lengths windows (0 6 months; 
7 12  months,  13 24  months  and  25 36  months)  the  mean  of  job  characteristics  of  the 
guaranteed job are displayed. 























4    Working
5 
  1  2  3  4  5 
Ln gross wage  0.481***  0.554***  0.722***  0.747***  0.726*** 
  (0.0981)  (0.122)  (0.145)  (0.147)  (0.146) 
  [0.010858]  [0.011949]  [0.012646]  [0.013382]  [0.013197] 
           
Hazards   0.016***   0.014***   0.0160**   0.0160**   0.0159** 
   (0.00518)  (0.00522)  (0.00659)  (0.00669)  (0.00661) 
  [ 0.00036]  [ 0.00030]  [ 0.00028]  [ 0.00029]  [ 0.00029] 
            
Workload  0.00375  0.00424  0.00463  0.00444  0.00456 
  (0.00380)  (0.00386)  (0.00494)  (0.00502)  (0.00495) 
  [0.00009]  [0.00009]  [0.00008]  [0.00008]  [0.000082] 
           
Working hours   0.00260   0.00609   0.00548   0.00550   0.00531 
   (0.00363)  (0.00380)  (0.00449)  (0.00456)  (0.00450) 
  [ 0.00006]  [ 0.00013]  [ 0.00010]  [ 0.00010]  [ 0.00010] 
           
Work evenings  0.261**  0.242*  0.257*  0.271*  0.262* 
  (0.126)  (0.128)  (0.155)  (0.158)  (0.156) 
  [0.006386]  [0.005628]  [0.004885]  [0.005296]  [0.005165] 
           
Night work  0.0352   0.111   0.187   0.194   0.193 
  (0.172)  (0.176)  (0.209)  (0.213)  (0.210) 
  [0.00081]  [ 0.00230]  [ 0.00304]  [ 0.00322]  [ 0.00325] 
           
Shift work   0.306**  0.313**  0.398**  0.396**  0.394** 
  (0.129)  (0.132)  (0.158)  (0.161)  (0.159) 
  [0.007712]  [0.007553]  [0.008062]  [0.008196]  [0.008264] 
           
Rho  0.06044**  0.06415**  0.19266**  0.2080***  0.1970*** 
  (0.02557)  (0.028385)  (0.039845)  (0.039769)  (0.040834) 
           
Constant   4.783***   5.884***   6.452***   6.888***   6.605*** 
  (0.315)  (1.583)  (2.019)  (1.946)  (1.921) 
            
Observations  28587  28587  28587  28587  28587 
Note: The coefficients are from a discrete logistic duration estimation with frailty (log normal 
distributed individual permanent residual). Standard errors are in parentheses: *significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% . Marginal effects are displayed in brackets. Note 
furthermore, rho is the coefficient of the individual time invariant error term. 
1 Model 1: no further controls are included 
2 Model 2: Additional controls: partner, age, age squared, education, further births, region & income 
3 Model 3: Additional controls, besides the ones in model 2 are sector, month and year dummies 
4 Model 4: I use log(t) for the baseline hazard  





Table 7: Marginal willingness to pay for amenities associated with work 
 

























0.5507074**  0.2438215 
Note: The above displayed coefficients for the MWP for 
certain  amenities  are  calculated  according  to  equation 
(8) using the estimated coefficients shown in column 3 


















Table 8a: MWP to avoid hazards for mothers from different income and education groups 
  MWP to avoid hazards for  
different income groups
1 
MWP to avoid hazards for  




 0.0181097  0.0252595 
 
(0.0139026)  (0.03283735) 
Intermed. group 
 0.0198574   0.0264861** 
 
(0.016515)  (0.0132521) 
High group 
 0.0246236   0.0770507** 
 
(0.0167083)  (0.0402541) 
Note: Using the results of a discrete logistic duration estimation with lognormal frailty including interaction terms 
between the job characteristics and the income group or the education respectively, I can calculate the displayed 
MWP for certain amenities according to equation (8). Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below. The results 
of the discrete duration model are available upon request. The income groups are created according to the income 
thresholds of the maternal benefit payment described in Section 3. The educational levels correspond to the three 
school tracks offer in Germany; a lower one leading to a vocational training, an intermediate one, and a higher one 






Table 8b: MWP for the working schedule distinguishing between East and West Germany 
  MWP for West Germany  MWP for East Germany 
Working hours   0.0129437**  0.0334376 
  (0.0064421)  (0.0224744) 
Evening Work  0.5372999**   0.5589431 
  (0.2468721)  (0.5306652) 
Shift Work  0.5432546**  0.4529273 
  (0.2527735)  (0.5197006) 
Note: Using the results of a discrete logistic duration estimation with lognormal frailty including interaction 
terms between the region and the job characteristics, I can calculate the displayed MWP for certain amenities 
according to equation (8). Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below. The results of the discrete duration 





    Table 9a: Comparison of job characteristics previous and posterior to maternity leave 
  Job characteristics 
previous to leave 
Job characteristics  
posterior to leave 
Ln real gross wage  2.4278  2.3708 
Hazards  8.8015  9.3647 
Workload  39.7026  39.7704 
Working hours  35.7102  27.2039 
Work in the evening  0.2602  0.2504 
Night work  0.1138  0.1008 
Shift work  0.1396  0.1463 
Note:  Column 1 shows the characteristics reported by a woman before going on leave and column 2 
the ones reported by a mother conditional on having come back to work. The sample sizes is thus 
restricted to the women who are returning to work and whose job characteristics are observed both 





Table 9b: MWP for disamenities in the different years of maternity leave 
 
  MWP for year 1  MWP for year 2  MWP for year 3 
Hazards 
 0.0217417   0.0219407   0.02384 
 
(0.0102714)  (0.0103862)  (0.0124751) 
Work evenings 
0.3490383  0.3522338  0.3827248 
 
(0.2289736)  (0.2306461)  (0.2648292) 
Rotating shifts 
0.5401274  0.5450724  0.5922564 
 
(0.2464307)  (0.2487048)  (0.3004254) 
Note: The table above is based on the results of a discrete duration estimation with lognormal frailty 
including interaction terms of the wage with dummies for each of the three years of maternity leave. 
Using equation (8) I can calculate the MWP for each amenity but depending on the year after giving 
birth. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis. The results of the discrete duration model are 
available upon request. 
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